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CoronaMelder is the digital contact tracing app based on exposure notification
support in the mobile operating systems of Google and Apple. It was introduced
in September 2021 and has been active during the second wave of COVID-
19 infections in The Netherlands. This assessment starts with week 42, 2020
(Monday October 12) and ends after week 19, 2021 (Sunday May 16).
In this paper, we quantitatively assess the effectiveness of CoronaMelder
and compare its digital contact tracing effectiveness to the manual contact trac-
ing performed by the Dutch health authorities organized in the regional GGD
services. We compute a number of metrics to characterize effectiveness. An
important metric is averted cases: an estimate of the number of avoided in-
fections of COVID-19, up to May 16. This is not a full total, because this
number will continue to rise going forward, because avoided cases in one week
will lead to more avoided cases in the next week until the pandemic comes to
a full halt. From the number of avoided infections, one can also estimate the
amount of averted deaths by COVID-19 and averted hospitalizations due
to COVID-19, both for normal hospital beds and for patients in Intensive Care
Units (ICUs) – under the assumption that each of these three occur for a spe-
cific percentage of infections. We also estimate the Rt reduction percentage.
We compute Rt mimicking the method of the Dutch health institute RIVM:
assuming a 4-day serial interval, i.e. Rt is the growth rate of the amount of
daily infected persons with respect to that same amount 4 days earlier.
In this paper, we estimate these metrics for adding manual contact tracing
to the standard quarantine and test measures (i.e. ”after noting symptoms,
quarantine and get a test at GGD immediately”). We also estimate both metrics
above for adding the CoronaMelder app to manual contact tracing, under the
policy of quarantining immediately after a CoronaMelder warning.1
1A Google Sheet with this model can be found on https://bit.ly/2QEwPHc
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1.1 A Word of Warning
The computed estimated metrics should not be taken literally. In the first place,
both metrics characterize things that did not happen (e.g. ”averted infections”).
It is fundamentally impossible to prove the validity of such a metric. In the
second place, the estimates are based on models. It is unknown how well these
models characterize reality and there are large and unknown variations on their
parameters, making the estimated metrics quite uncertain.2
One model is the characteristics of the COVID-19 infection (e.g. infectivity
over time). This model (using a Weibull distribution) is generally used, but it
is not exact. In particular, it is known that the disease trajectory varies among
patients, something not captured here. A second model is on the behavior of
the Dutch population, in particular, the adherence to measures like ”quarantine
and test on symptoms”, as well as adherence to warnings given to contacts by
manual contact tracers and adherence to app warnings.
However, we have tried to use the best possible information in both models.
Regarding the infectivity model, based on publications in scientific literature [5,
1]. Regarding the adherence, we used information from three interview panels
(LISS, PanelClix and the RIVM behavioural studies group).
Finally, our estimates are not only model-based, as an important part of
the numbers that go into our computations are actual amounts of positive tests
(which characterize the contact tracing effort accurately) and the actual size
of the pandemic in the Netherlands (estimated from hospitalization numbers
and serology studies). As such, our estimates are more than just a hypothetical
scenario: they estimate the effectiveness of the app and manual contact tracing
based on observed quantities of positive tests and hospitalizations in the period
October 12 - May 16 in The Netherlands.
Though we believe the literal values of the metrics we estimate should be
taken with many grains of salt, we do believe that comparing these metrics
between digital and manual contact tracing gives useful insight on the relative
effectiveness of these instruments to combat COVID-19.
1.2 How CoronaMelder Works
The CoronaMelder app was developed over summer 2020 by a team put together
by the Dutch ministry of Health (VWS) and uses the first version of the GAEN
API (Google Apple Exposure Notification application programming interface).
GAEN causes mobile phones to periodically emit random identifiers (numbers)
derived from a so-called Temporary Exposure Key (TEK) in bluetooth messages.
Each mobile phone generates randomly a new TEK each day. Other devices in
the neighbourhood can pick up these messages containing the random identifier.
GAEN does not emit the TEK directly, as this would make tracking easy: the
random identifier derived from the TEK changes every 20 minutes. The app
also computes whether multiple of such bluetooth messages received during a
2Our estimates could be improved with a parameter sensitivity analysis, though the prob-
ability distributions for the parameter values would still be unknown.
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span of at least 10 minutes pass a risk threshold, i.e. have a bluetooth signal
strength (pattern) indicating likely proximity within 1.5 meters.
When someone tests positive (the ”index” case), the GGD employee per-
forming the manual contact tracing phone call will ask the index whether she
uses CoronaMelder, and if yes, will ask whether the index wants to pass a key
that can be read from the CoronaMelder app. If this happens, this ”GGD key”
is sent to the app backend (a central server hosted by VWS) for white-listing.
The user is then asked to (voluntarily) press a button in the CoronaMelder app
to also upload the relevant TEKs to that backend, along with the GGD key.
The backend only publishes TEKs from persons with a white-listed GGD key,
i.e. only those with a confirmed COVID-19 positive PCR test can upload TEKs.
GAEN remembers received random identifiers from the last 14 days on a
mobile phone. To warn people, we typically need less than 14 TEKs: only
TEKs for the days the index was infectious. This ”infectiousness window” is
determined in the GGD manual tracing phone call, by asking for the day of
symptom onset (if the index has no symptoms, the current day is used). The
infectious window starts two days before the onset of symptoms, and ends on the
day of the phone call. So in addition to passing the GGD key to the backend for
white-listing, the GGD also passes to the backend the matching infectiousness
window. When the CoronaMelder app of the index uploads the 14 TEKs, the
backend keeps only the TEKs for the days the index was deemed to be infectious.
All CoronaMelder apps (try to) synchronise six times per day with the back-
end. This happens in the background. When it connects, CoronaMelder down-
loads all new TEKs and checks whether messages with identifiers generated
from these TEKs have been received and, if so, whether these messages exceed
the risk threshold. If this is the case, the CoronaMelder warns the user that
there was a dangerous exposure with a COVID-19 infected person on the date
those messages were received, and the user is advised to quarantine until 10
days after this dangerous exposure. From December 1, this advice was changed
to also plan a GGD PCR test on the fifth day after the dangerous exposure; if
that test returns negative, the user can then stop quarantine immediately.
2 Modeling Quarantine and Infectivity
We estimate the effectiveness of manual contact tracing and the CoronaMelder
app using a model of the Dutch situation in October 12, 2020 - May 16, 2021
that quantifies how much of the maximum possible infections get realized, under
various policies and instruments that influence quarantining behavior.
First we introduce the input to the model (data and parameters) and then
introduce the concept of Tertiary Attack Fraction, denoted λ – analogous
to the weighting function in [7]. Then, we discuss the various types of cases
Dutch health authority GGD registers every week, and finally we derive specific
average λ values for each type of case. Table 1 contains a compact overview
of all parameters and formulas we use for estimating our λ’s – these will be
discussed and explained in this section.
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2.1 Data Sources and Model Parameters
We use the following data sources and parameters also shown in Table 1:
• weekly numbers of PCR tests performed by GGD services for COVID-19
performed, and the amount of positive cases (indexes for contact tracing),
as shared in RIVM open data [12].
• weekly reports by RIVM on contact tracing efforts by GGD [10]. The
Tuesday afternoon reports mentions the amount of cases found as a result
of manual contact tracing.
• weekly reports my the Dutch ministry of health on the effectiveness of
the Dutch CoronaMelder app, which mention the amount of people who
contacted GGD, mentioning a CoronaMelder warning as one of the reasons
for getting a test [3]. Further, the amount of positive cases among these is
reported, split out between people who where symptomatic or not when
planning the test [4].
• NICE, a foundation evaluating ICUs (https://stichting-nice.nl) publishes
daily hospitalization statistics, which we extract from Marino van Zelst’s
github [9]. This number is used to estimate the amount of weekly infec-
tions. In particular, serology studies in June 2020 found 5% of the pop-
ulation with antibodies [13]. Noting the 11K hospitalizations (non-ICU)
due to COVID-19 up to that point, we estimate the infection hospitaliza-
tion rate IHR=0.0132 and assume this has remained constant. Further,
until May 2021 the amount of ICU cases were on average 19% of hospi-
talizations, so we estimate the Infection ICU Rate IIR=0.0025. Finally,
during the second wave (Sept 1, 2020 - May 16, 2021) there were roughly
20K COVID-19 fatalities [2], while there were 45K hospitalizations in that
period, and hence an estimated 3.4M infections; leading to an Infection
Fatality Rate (IFR) of IFR=0.006
• Panel studies by LISS and PanelClix [15] and the RIVM behavioral unit[11]3.
In particular, a PanelClix study suggests that Eapp=.58 of people who re-
ceived a CoronaMelder warning, was never contacted by manual contact
tracers. The RIVM behavioral unit makes estimates of quarantine+test
adherence to manual contact tracing warnings and CoronaMelder warn-
ings (both ACT=Aapp=0.67, being a weighted mix of adherence with and
without symptoms) [6]; as well as adherence to quarantine-and-test on
symptoms (.50). The latter is down-adjusted to Abase=.35 under the
RIVM assumption that .30 of COVID-19 infections lead to very light to
no symptoms (and hence also to no adherence). Finally, RIVM reports
ECT=.60 of contacts are already alerted by the index personally when
GGD CT contacts them.4
3We thank Janneke van de Wijgert Wolfgang Ebbers, Ka Yin Leung and Don Klinkenberg
for valuable discussions on modeling contact tracing and its epidemiological parameters.
4RIVM estimates .80 even [6], but we down-adjust this, as RIVM also states that personal
warnings have lower adherance to getting a test than a CT warning (.68 vs .9).
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2.2 Tertiary Attack Fraction λ
Let us now explain the calculation of λ, summarized in Table 1. A COVID-19
infected person on average takes tsym=5 days to get symptoms, but only after
tplan=2 more days contacts GGD to plan a test. From that moment it takes
tpers=1 day to learn about the result, and tell close friends about this personally.
However, from planning a test it takes GGD tCT=3 days to reach contacts using
manual contact tracing. Warnings via the app take a bit less: tapp=2 days still,
mainly because the infected person needs to wait for the contact tracing phone
call in order to pass the GGD key.5
All in all, the typical scenario above, of someone who tests on symptoms, and
whose contacts are warned using manual contact tracing, spans tsym+tplan+tCT
=10 days; via the app this spans one day less: tsym+tplan+tapp=9 days. Because
app adoption Uapp=0.16, only 16% of indexes has the app and can inform only
16% of possible contacts6 so only (Uapp)
2=3% of contacts is warned by the
app. The GGD case numbers show that the manual contact tracing process
thoroughly dominates over the app, currently.
If we look at the infectivity distribution [5] Iw, we see that typically no
infections happen in the first two days, and most (83%) happen in days 3-7 of
the infection (22% on day 3, 22% on day 4, 18% on day 5, 13% on day 6 and
8% on day 7 – in total 83% in the first week). As mentioned, the infectivity
distribution is known to vary from person-to-person[1]; however Iw represents
the average trajectory of infectivity over time. We assume that calculating
infections using this average trajectory will not come out much different from
doing so using probabilistic trajectories (where trajectories of different persons
vary around the averages). We keep it simple in this regard, because our further
calculation of λ would otherwise become much harder to formulate.
Let us assume for a moment a hypothetical basic scenario with just the
quarantine-on-symptoms policy in place, i.e. a society without testing, contact
tracing or app. Adherence in any scenario is only partial: many people will
actually not quarantine. This leads to an adjusted “adhering” infectivity dis-
tribution Ia, where fraction Abase no longer infects after reaching the point of
taking action because of symptoms (i.e. from day tsym+tplan=7), but the rest
of the population does not quarantine and keeps infecting. Based on average
infectivity Ia(x) on day x, we also calculate the cumulative fraction of realized
infection potential Ic(x), which is the running sum of the former.
Let us go back to a situation where we do have testing, contact tracing and
an app. Given the infectivity distribution, it is clear that an index who decides
to test and quarantine after 7 days has already performed 83% of secondary
infections that would have occurred even if testing did not exist. That is, both
manual contact tracing and the app can only significantly reduce the number
of tertiary infections. That is why we focus on tertiary infections as the metric
of contact tracing effectiveness.
5Allowing app users who test positively to directly inform app contacts tpers=1 day after
planning a test, without waiting for the GGD phone call, would improve effectiveness.
6We ignore any networking effect here for the moment (which could boost app effectivity).
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symbol value description source
IHR 0.0132 Infection Hospitalization Rate (excl. ICU hospitalization) NICE [9],
IIR 0.0025 Infection ICU (Intensive Care Unit hospitalization) Rate Sanquin [13] &
IFR 0.0060 Infection Fatality Rate CBS [2]
Fsym 0.70 Fraction of infected people who exhibit symptoms. RIVM[12][6][11]
Asym 0.50 Adherence to q+t (quarantine+test) on symptoms. RIVM[12][6][11]
Abase 0.35 effective base adherence Asym ∗ Fsym RIVM[12][6][11]
ACT+ 0.75 q+t adherence to CT warning (with symptoms). RIVM[12][6][11]
ACT− 0.50 q+t adherence to CT warning (no symptoms). RIVM[12][6][11]
ACT 0.67 q+t adherence to CT warning: FsymACT++(1−Fsym)ACT−
Aapp+ 0.75 q+t adherence to app warning (with symptoms). RIVM[12][6][11]
Aapp− 0.50 q+t adherence to app warning (no symptoms). RIVM[12][6][11]
Aapp 0.67 q+t adherence to app warning: FsymAapp++(1−Fsym)Aapp−
ECT 0.60 Fraction of CT contacts already informed personally by index RIVM[12][6][11]
Eapp 0.58 Fraction of app warnings to contacts not reached by CT PanelClix[15]
FCT 0.50 Fraction of contacts infected by index found by CT RIVM[12][6][11]
Fapp 0.50 Fraction of contacts infected by index found by app RIVM[12][6][11]
Uapp 0.16 Usage of app (estimated from CT phone call data) GGD[3]
tsym 5 days from start of infection to developing symptoms RIVM[12][6][11]
tplan 2 days from symptoms to planning a test RIVM[12][6][11]
tCT 3 days from planning a test to contact tracing warnings RIVM[12][6][11]
tapp 2 days from planning a test to app warnings RIVM[12][6][11]
tpers 1 day from planning a test to personal warnings RIVM[12][6][11]
Weibull infectivity Iw(x) =fraction of total infections caused on day C from getting the disease
Adhering infectivity Ia(x)=Iw(x) if x≤ tsym+tplan; else Ia(x) = Iw(x)(1−Abase)
Cumulative adhering infectivity Ic(x)=
∑x
i=1 Ia(i)
day C: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14..∞
Iw(x) .0000 .0000 .2200 .2200 .1800 .1300 .0800 .0500 .0400 .0200 .0200 .0200 .0100 .0000
Ia(x) .0000 .0000 .2200 .2200 .1800 .1300 .0800 .0325 .0260 .0130 .0130 .0130 .0065 .0000
Ic(x) .0000 .0000 .2200 .4400 .6200 .7500 .8300 .8625 .8885 .9015 .9145 .9275 .9340 .9340
Tertiary Attack Fraction λ(x): fraction of infection potential by contacts, index q+t after day x
λ(x)=λ(1, x) :index does q+t on day C & warns with 0 latency, all contacts receive+adhere
α∈{CT ,app}:λα(x): index q+t on day C, warns in tα, Fα contacts receive, Aα of them adhere
λ(1, x) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0484 .1452 .2728 .4092 .5340 .6452 .7125 .7700 .8135 .8491
λapp(x) .0000 .0000 .1269 .2781 .4259 .5549 .6546 .7254 .7712 .8060 .8338 .8577 .8607 .8607
λCT (x) .0000 .0000 .1511 .3221 .4798 .6085 .6992 .7546 .7977 .8255 .8494 .8577 .8607 .8607
λ(l, h) =
∑l+h−1
x=1 Iw(x)Ic(l+h−x) : day x index infects Iw(x) contacts; they infect Ic(l+h−x)
λα(x) = AαFαλ(tα, x)+(1−AαFα)Ic(x)Ic(∞) :weighted adherent+reached vs not
All types of cases (Cα) counted in week w and their average Tertiary Attack Fractions (λα)
C(w): all estimated cases=Hospitalization(w)/IHR
Cmiss(w): missed cases=C(w)-
∑
∀α6=miss Cα(w) λmiss 0.87 =Ic(∞)2
Csym(w): cases found after symptoms λsym 0.70 =λCT(tsym+tplan) = λCT (7)
Cpers(w): cases found after a personal warning λpers 0.36 =ΛCT(tpers,tsym+tplan,0)
CCT (w): cases found by manual contact tracing λCT 0.60 =ΛCT(tCT ,tsym+tplan,0)
Capp+(w): cases found by app with symptoms λapp+ 0.60 =∆(tsym−1,tapp+tplan+1,0)
Capp−(w): cases found by app before symptoms λapp− 0.27 =∆(tapp,tsym−1,tapp+tplan+1)





x=1Iw(x+b) : weighted λα, index loose [l, l+h] days
Table 1: parameters and equations to model the Tertiary Attack Fraction λ
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To explain: when a manual contact tracing or app warning reaches an in-
fected contact (i.e., a secondary infection) on day x, this person should quaran-
tine and plan a test. Not all contacts will be reached (fraction FCT resp. Fapp
only) and not all of the ones reached will adhere (fraction ACT resp. Aapp only)
to this policy either. The secondary contacts who are reached and adhere will
quarantine and stop creating any more tertiary infections after day x. Hence,
the earlier the warning arrives (the lower x is) the more the tertiary spread is
reduced. We thus define the Tertiary Attack Fraction λ(x) as the fraction
of all possible tertiary infections that a primary case causes when contacts get
warned on day x. This is a number between [0-1], where 1 is the worst-case
situation where nobody ever quarantines.
2.3 The Various Types of Cases
GGD gathers weekly counts of various types of cases. In addition, we estimate
all new weekly cases (based on hospitalizations), and with that we can also
estimate the missed cases. The various case counts for each week w are:
• C(w): an estimated of the amount of people who were infected with
COVID-19 that week. Assuming GGD finds most cases after at least
7 days, and assuming average hospitalization is on day 12, we use the sum
of hospitalizations during the 7-day period 5 days later (i.e., hospitaliza-
tions in the interval 5 to 12 days from start of week w) and dividing that
by the IHR=0.0132.
• Csym(w): cases found by GGD (i.e. people who tested positive) on their
own initiative, after developing symptoms.
• CCT (w): cases found by GGD after manual contact tracing. From the
reported numbers of CT (Dutch abbreviation: BCO) cases we subtract
fraction ECT=.60, because these cases had already been informed person-
ally of their possible infection by the index. That is, these people were
already warned, and manual contact tracing was not required for that.
• Cpers(w): the amount of manual contact tracing cases that had already
been informed earlier personally by their index, as mentioned under the
previous point (i.e. 60% of the total amount of reported CT cases).
• Capp−(w): pre-symptomatic people who tested positive after an app warn-
ing (early cases, without symptoms).7
• Capp+(w): all other cases found thanks to an app notification.
• Cmiss(w): all missed cases that week. This is C(w) minus the sum of all
categories above (which are exclusive).
7One would expect (1−Fsymp)Aapp−/(FsympAapp+ + (1−Fsymp)Aapp−)=0.24 of app cases
never to develop symptoms. As we see fraction 0.30 of app cases without symptoms when
planning a test, only 0.06 are considered pre-symptomatic. Hence we down-correct to 1/5th
of GGD-reported app cases without symptoms as Capp−(w) and add the rest to Capp+(w).
7
Our modeling is based on computing a weekly TAF volume. This is done by





2.4 Estimating λ per Type of Case
We now discuss how we estimate the various λ’s:
• λmiss People who do not test may still quarantine, and hence follow dis-
tribution Ia. Their realized (fraction of potential) infections through the
whole disease is Ic(∞). The secondary infections they cause in turn, are
also not on any contact tracing radar and will not be warned; only no-
tice symptoms. Hence they similarly follow the base scenario behaviour
and eventually realize Ic(∞) of their potential infections. Hence we take
λmiss=(Ic(∞))2=0.87
• λsym As mentioned, cases found because they tested on symptoms, typi-
cally quarantine after 7 days, but it takes up to day 10 for manual contact
tracing to reach their contacts. At that moment, 22% of those secondary
infections was infected 8 days ago and thus reached Ic(8)=.8652 of their
tertiary infection potential. Similarly, another 22% of contacts was in-
fected 7 days ago and realized Ic(7)=.83, 18% realized Ic(6)=.75, 13%
realized Ic(5)=.62 and 5% realized Ic(4)=.44. We denote the sum of all





We have to take into account, however, that not all secondary infections
warned on day x will be reached and, if so, that they adhere. This means
that the non-reached fraction (1−ACTFCT ) of secondary contagion Ic(x)
on day x will be unimpeded and realize Ic(∞) tertiary contagion:
λα(x) = AαFαλ(tα, tα+x)+(1−AαFα)Ic(x)Ic(∞) (3)
For simplicity of the formula, we focus only on warnings via manual con-
tact tracing (α = CT ) and ignore app warnings, because – as mentioned
before – only 3% of contacts is covered only by the app due to its low
current adoption. All in all λsym=λCT (7)=0.70.
• λCT An important goal for manual contact tracing is to find contacts
as early as possible, leading to quarantine that is hopefully faster than
the 7 days that people who test-on-symptoms achieve. GGD reports for
week w on the amount of cases found through manual contact tracing
CCT (w), but regrettably does not report a distribution of the time since
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onset of symptoms for those CT-cases (average moment of infection would
be onset-of-symptoms minus tsym=5 days). Hence, we have to estimate
this distribution. We use the distribution caused by an index who tested
because of symptoms after 7 days, and whose contacts got warned 3 days
later (after 10 days). This means the contacts had been “loose” for 10-4
days. We thus estimate λCT using a weighted mix of λCT (x+ 1) with C








For λCT , we have α=CT – we reuse this formula also for α=app further
on. All in all, λCT=ΛCT (tCT , tsym+tplan, 0) = ΛCT (3, 7, 0)=0.60
• λpers People who get warned personally by an index gain two days (warn-
ing time tpers=1, whereas tCT=3 days). Similar to CT we use λpers =
ΛCT (tpers, tsym+tplan, 0) = ΛCT (1, 7, 0)=0.36
• λapp+, λapp− App users tested because of an app warning, warn their sec-
ondary infections both using the app and via manual contact tracing. We
therefore mix their Λ calculations via ∆ according to app usage Uapp:
∆(l,h,b) = UappΛapp(l,h,b) + (1−Uapp)ΛCT (l,h,b) (5)
GGD counts people who test because of an app warning separately for
those who requested the test while having symptoms (app+) and without
symptoms yet (app−). Without this split, we would estimate λapp=∆(tapp,
tsym+tplan, 0)=∆(2, 7, 0)=0.50, but in order to split it, we assume the cases
without symptoms to be in day 3-4 of their infection, and the symptomatic
cases to be in days 5-9.
Here base variable b comes into play and we estimate λapp+=∆(tsym−
1,tapp+tplan+1,0)=∆(4, 5, 0)=0.60 and respectively λapp−=∆(tapp,tsym−
1,tapp+tplan+1) =∆(2, 2, 5)=0.27. This low TAF of asymptomatic app
cases (λapp−= 0.27) in comparison with missed cases (λmiss=0.83) reflects
that the promise of GAEN apps to find cases early, can have significant
impact on tertiary infections.
3 Estimating Effectiveness
As defined in equation (1), given the case counts and their respective TAF’s,
we can compute a weekly TAF volume λ(w). As TAF volume stands for the
amount of infection opportunities, we assume that it is linearly related with
C(w+1), the number of cases in the next week. Because we can calculate the
contribution to weekly TAF volume CCT (w)λCT of manual contact tracing, we
can also calculate the additional TAF volume that would have been if manual
contact tracing would not exist and these cases would have been missed, i.e.
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CCT (w)(λmiss−λCT ). This in turn leads to the definition of estimated averted
(“saved”) cases SCT in week w+1, ∀w ≥ 0:
SCT (w+1) = C6CT (w+1) ∗ CCT (w)(λmiss − λCT )/λ(w) (6)
where Sα(0)=0, and C6α(w) is the total amount of cases in week w if α (here,
α=CT ) would not have been there. This sequence starts equal to C at w=0:
C6α(0) = C(0) (7)
and continues by cumulatively adding the averted cases to the epidemic, ∀w ≥ 0:
C6α(w+1) = C6α(w) ∗ (C(w+1)/C(w)) + Sα(w) (8)
The averted cases by the app Sapp is defined similar to SCT :
Sapp(w+1) = C6app(w+1)∗((Capp−(w)(λmix−λapp−)+Capp+(w)(λmix−λapp+))/λ(w)
(9)
Here λmix=Eappλmiss+(1−Eapp)λCT because fraction 1−Eapp=.42 of cases
found by the app would have been found by manual contact tracing (only, later),
whereas fraction Eapp=.58 of app cases would have been missed altogether.
w Kapp Cmiss/C C Csym Cpers CCT Capp− Capp+ SCT Sapp
2020-42 0 8.4 0.58 134772 53531 1760 1029 0 344 0 0
2020-43 1 12.4 0.54 145302 62259 2309 1243 0 705 344 64
2020-44 2 15.6 0.53 134014 55732 4284 2604 0 600 676 173
2020-45 3 15.2 0.61 114620 37278 4090 2567 0 380 1284 239
2020-46 4 13.3 0.61 97650 30140 4390 2770 0 372 1783 260
2020-47 5 13.3 0.60 91210 28481 4888 3121 0 328 2490 305
2020-48 6 13.5 0.60 83407 25070 4869 3088 0 377 3200 332
2020-49 7 12.3 0.58 100073 30195 6926 4375 106 447 5054 479
2020-50 8 13.8 0.51 122875 42627 10139 6402 235 567 8005 728
2020-51 9 14.3 0.44 138329 54945 13451 8490 346 718 11507 1023
2020-52 10 14.4 0.55 147419 44924 12976 8273 251 597 15524 1358
2020-53 11 13.8 0.59 136131 35065 12385 7942 185 526 17071 1431
2021-01 12 12.8 0.56 113480 30728 11656 7500 175 433 16629 1323
2021-02 13 12.3 0.63 106056 23329 9345 6021 147 321 18161 1365
2021-03 14 12.7 0.64 99465 21286 8488 5485 139 247 19141 1379
2021-04 15 12.0 0.69 94162 17572 6617 4264 116 210 20087 1390
2021-05 16 11.4 0.71 90601 15693 6374 4141 76 165 20882 1410
2021-06 17 10.9 0.73 88707 14338 5654 3670 88 129 21999 1433
2021-07 18 10.7 0.68 88858 17127 6887 4482 90 151 23455 1486
2021-08 19 10.0 0.65 90070 18541 7608 4950 95 174 25579 1563
2021-09 20 10.4 0.67 94463 18591 7720 5018 119 162 28940 1705
2021-10 21 10.3 0.64 105371 22556 9420 6115 183 171 34590 1978
2021-11 22 10.5 0.63 122869 26854 10831 7054 136 230 43354 2412
2021-12 23 10.9 0.59 124990 29986 12658 8238 174 269 47195 2542
2021-13 24 10.9 0.61 123399 28490 11584 7523 199 235 50219 2615
2021-14 25 10.5 0.58 118778 28998 12097 7835 241 258 51608 2621
2021-15 26 10.3 0.60 132791 31253 12962 8427 170 306 61769 3074
2021-16 27 10.7 0.58 133397 32710 13897 9039 218 275 66047 3201
2021-17 28 2.9 0.55 111883 29912 12301 8021 149 248 59076 2789
2021-18 29 11.3 0.50 93551 27080 11923 7772 149 240 52754 2413
2021-19 30 10.3 0.52 74386 20363 9285 6058 129 160 45177 1996
sum: 3763515 955653 269774 173518 3916 10345 773599 45088
Table 2: COVID-19 epidemic in The Netherlands from week 42/2020 until week
20/2021. We show weekly cases (Cα) of type α, estimated averted cases (Sα).
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3.1 Results
Table 2 shows actual measurements of Csym, Cpers, CCT , Capp−, Capp+ ; where
we clarify once again that the number of manual contact tracing indexes reported
by GGD was split by us using fraction ECT = .6 in Cpers and CCT . The column
C is estimated from the hospitalizations reported by NICE, and Cmiss is derived
from this (by subtracting all GGD-reported cases). The numbers of averted
cases are also estimates, calculated as described earlier in this section. Column
Kapp is the percentage of indexes who in the contact tracing phone call indicate
to have the app installed and agrees to pass the GGD key that will authorize
them to send an app notification. This can be seen as a proxy for app usage
(Uapp=.16). The maximum value is 15.6% but has been going down to slightly
above 10%.8 Studies among GGD personnel [14] cast doubt on whether this
information is properly gathered during all GGD manual contact tracing calls
and therefore K should be taken as a lower bound for Uapp. The total number
of CoronaMelder downloads (>4.9M, a fraction .28 of Dutch population) was
used as upper bound to arrive at estimate Uapp=.16
We see in the last row that manual contact tracing averted SCT=773K infec-
tions in this period. This estimate is 4.5% of Dutch population (17.4M total).
For this reason, the effect of saturation is considered to be small (<10%), and
we ignore it in the SCT estimate.
Using the sum of estimated averted cases SCT and Sapp, we can also estimate
the amount of averted hospitalizations, ICU cases and deaths (by multiplying
with resp. IHR, IIR and IFR). By calculating the effect of CT and app on
the weekly growth rate, and recomputing that into a weekly Rt (growth rate to
the power 4/7 – given the 4-day serial interval Dutch RIVM uses for calculating
Rt), we can also calculate the average reduction factor on Rt achieved. The
results of such rough calculations are shown in Table 3.
12 October 2020 - Manual Contact Tracing CoronaMelder
16 May 2021 (α=CT ) (α=app)
averted cases Sα 773599 45088
averted hospitalizations 10212 595
averted ICU cases 1934 113
averted deaths 4642 271
average reduction of Rt 0.0091 0.0005
Table 3: Estimates of Effectiveness of CT and App as an enhancement of CT.
Caveat: unknown error margins, unverifiable estimations. Apply grains of salt!
8In week 2021-04, a scandal broke when it was revealed that GGD contact tracing data
was being traded illegally via corrupt employees, who had access to too much data with too
little oversight. It seems this cost 16% of app adoption (Kapp decreased from 12% to 10% by
2021-08), which never fully recovered.
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4 Discussion
Despite the large and unknown error margins of our estimates, it is clear that
the effects of the CoronaMelder app have been much smaller than Dutch man-
ual contact tracing. Our metric of averted cases differs by a factor 17 (i.e.,
this suggests the app enhanced effectiveness of manual contact tracing by 6%).
However, CoronaMelder did have a small but positive effect on the epidemic
and it is likely that lives were saved (the rough estimate being a few hundred).
In terms of a qualitative conclusion on the effectiveness, we think one should
take into account the following factors that could affect the future picture:
improved app usage Uapp. We have now estimated app usage at only 16%.
User studies in LISS and PanelClix indicate, however, that at least 40% of Dutch
population is willing to use the app, but many have not installed it yet. A better
communication strategy, and bundling or syndication of the various COVID
apps of the Dutch Health Ministry9 thus has fertile ground to significantly
increase adoption. Any improvement factor in adoption quadratically improves
effectiveness; e.g., at 30% by a factor 4, and at 40% by a factor 6.
improved risk score. CoronaMelder still uses GAEN version 1 – while the
UK evaluation [16] which showed stronger effectiveness than we observe here,
mentions an increase in effectiveness after adopting GAEN version 2 and using
a better risk score method based on Kalman filters [8]. Implementing this in
CoronaMelder likely will improve Fapp.
more anonymous contacts. Unlike the quite successful UK app [16], which
also operated in environments where at times bars and restaurants were open,
Dutch CoronaMelder app has until now only worked during a lockdown. This
means that people reduced the amount of contacts, and that settings (bars,
restaurants, universities, etc) with many anonymous contacts that manual con-
tact tracing cannot easily uncover, did not play much of a role. In a post-
vaccination scenario of an opened up society, with a significantly lower Rt,
manual contact tracing may in fact become less efficacious (due to more anony-
mous contacts), and the app would in such circumstances become relatively
more efficacious (as it can pick up anonymous contacts). The fraction of con-
tacts manual contact tracing can reach could possibly drop by at least a factor
2, while the fraction of contacts reached by the app will not diminish.
While there is now a disappointing factor 17:1 between infection coverage
achieved by manual contact tracing vs. the app, it thus cannot be discounted
that in a post-vaccination period during fall/winter 2021-2022 the effectiveness
of the app could come much closer to that of manual contact tracing (e.g.,
8:6) – if adoption and the risk scoring were to be improved. This means that
CoronaMelder could (partly) compensate for loss in coverage by manual context
tracing in an opened-up society.
9Beyond CoronaMelder, there is also CoronaChecker for showing testing/vaccination sta-
tus, and GGD Contact to self-enter data for manual contact tracing.
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